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A RULE OLD AND NEW, BORROWED AND BLUE: EXXON ADAPTS 
STATE PUNITIVE LIABILITY LAW TO CRAFT NEW 
INTERPRETATION IN ADMIRALTY 
INTRODUCTION 
Eleven million gallons of crude oil spilled, 1,500 shoreline miles 
contaminated, and nineteen years of litigation fought.1  These are the well-
known hallmarks of the cases collectively known as Exxon.  Yet, landmark 
liability and damages issues from this 1989 catastrophe continue to create 
slippery scenarios for today’s courts.  Complex issues of liability and damages 
resulting from the 1989 Exxon Valdez incident, the largest oil spill in United 
States maritime history, have created intense litigation now spanning two 
decades.2  Though the Supreme Court’s June 2008 treatment of this case 
marked the nearing finale of Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,3 the Court’s 
decision will become a landmark decision in not only admiralty law, but in all 
American punitive damage law. 
The Court’s milestone decision in Exxon carries value for all American 
courts regardless of their posture as admiralty courts.  The Court’s brief 
discourse on due process certainly requires the attention of lower courts and 
courts sitting in admiralty with facts similar to Exxon’s limitation on punitive 
damages.  A significant though less discussed strand will be that regarding 
common law limitation on nonadmiralty punitive damages. 
Exxon was decided under admiralty law given the accident’s occurrence on 
the seas; the precedent on which it must rely and for which it will stand is, 
strictly speaking, limited to admiralty.4  But Exxon’s limited posture as an 
admiralty case will not limit the inevitable significance the decision will bear 
 
 1.  Press Release, Defenders of Wildlife, Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: Fifteen Years Later 
(March 24, 2004), http://www.defenders.org/newsroom/press_releases_folder/2004/03_24_2004 
_exxon_valdez_oil_spill_fifteen_years_later; Exxon Valdez Case Heads to Closure After 19 
Years, Feb. 27, 2008, http://www.wholetruth.net/downloads/pressReleases/02272008%20Red% 
20Orbit.pdf. 
 2.  THE NAT’L RESPONSE TEAM, THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL: A REPORT TO THE 
PRESIDENT ES-2 (1989), available at http://www.akrrt.org/Archives/Response_Reports/Exxon 
Valdez_NRT_1989.pdf. 
 3.  554 U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008) [hereinafter Exxon]. 
 4. See id. at 2619 (discussing Exxon’s reliance upon admiralty law in the context of 
punitive damages). 
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on general American common law in the future.5  This note will establish the 
importance of the Exxon holding by drawing parallels to other cases of 
admiralty that have impacted the general common law.  At the core of this 
issue is the dynamic—and under-studied—interplay between the narrow area 
of admiralty law and the larger arena of general common law. 
In Exxon, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether 
punitive damages were appropriately awarded against Exxon for its liability in 
the 1989 oil spill and, if so, whether those damages were excessive.6  At the 
time the Court heard the case, the punitive damage award stood at $2.5 billion, 
dwarfing compensatory damages, which remained at $507.5 million.7  The 
issue of whether and how to limit excessive punitive damages arose under 
federal admiralty law and was an issue of first impression for the Court.8  
Monumentally, the Court drew a bright-line rule that limited punitive damages 
to the amount awarded in compensatory damages in maritime cases where 
reckless conduct resulted in injury.9  Readers are best primed to understand the 
underlying rationale of this stringent bright-line rule by first appreciating the 
key facts and context of this case. 
I.  FACTS 
The Exxon Valdez incident of 1989 has become the infamous oil spill in 
American history given its large size, traumatic environmental effect, and, 
most notably, the fact that it could have been prevented.10  Just minutes after 
midnight on March 24, 1989, an Exxon Valdez bulk oil carrier collided into 
Bligh Reef, located off the coast of Alaska.11  The vessel’s cargo consisted of 
more than 53 million gallons of crude oil.12  Within five hours, the vessel had 
spilled 10.1 million gallons of crude oil (20% of its total cargo) into the sea 
 
 5. For a discussion on the existence of a “general common law,” see Louise Weinberg, 
Back to the Future: The New General Common Law, 35 J. MAR. L. & COM. 523 (2004). 
 6. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2611. 
 7. Id. at 2611, 2634. 
 8. Id. at 2619. 
 9. Id. at 2633. 
 10. KARLENE H. ROBERTS & WILLIAM H. MOORE, MANAGEMENT OF HUMAN ERROR IN 
OPERATIONS OF MARINE SYSTEMS, A GORDIAN KNOT: INTO WHICH SAILED THE EXXON 
VALDEZ, REPORT NO. HOE-92-1, at 8, 10, 25 (Jan. 1992), available at http://www.mms.gov/ 
tarprojects/167/167AC.pdf (detailing the large margin for human error in maritime technology 
and Exxon’s policies and management which contributed to the risk and the compounding 
consequences); Edwin S. Rothschild, Letter to the Editor, A Debate over Punitive Damages, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 22, 1995, at F12.  For a detailed discussion regarding the National Response Team’s 
report and prevention recommendations to the U.S. President, see generally NAT’L RESPONSE 
TEAM, supra note 2. 
 11. THE NAT’L RESPONSE TEAM, supra note 2, at ES–1. 
 12. Id. at 3, A–1 (further noting this oil was contained in 1.26 million barrels). 
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and surrounding coast line.13  The oil enveloped 1,000 square miles by April 
13, just weeks after the spill.14 
The remote location of the spill confounded the already difficult cleanup 
efforts; it took clean-up personnel and their equipment two hours by boat to 
reach the spill site from Valdez, the nearest town.15  Exxon organized 12,000 
people and 1,500 boats to manually remove oil from the contaminated 
beaches.16  Crews used various methods to clean the spill, some of which 
proved controversial because small animals vital to the ecosystem were killed 
in the process.17  Oil was cleaned by burning it off, mechanically removing it 
from the water, and spraying it off with highly pressurized or heated water.18 
The initial accident resulted from a collision of compounding factors.  
While docked at port, the crew consumed multiple alcoholic beverages before 
picking up pizza to bring back onboard.19  While marine crew are not barred 
from drinking alcohol onshore, regulations provide for the amount of time that 
must pass between consumption and the continuation of responsibility 
onboard.20  The fact garnering the most media attention was Captain Joe 
Hazelwood’s conduct, who was not only a known recovering alcoholic, but 
also had a dangerously high blood-alcohol content following the accident.21  
Hazelwood abandoned the third mate, Gregory Cousins, on the bridge to 
complete navigational calculations (a violation of company policy that required 
 
 13. Id. at 12; see also R.T. Paine et al., Trouble on Oiled Waters: Lessons from the Exxon 
Valdez Oil Spill, 27 ANN. REV. ECOLOGY SYSTEMATICS 197, 198 (1996) (stating that, in sum, 
the vessel spilled 10.8 million gallons of oil). 
 14. THE NAT’L. RESPONSE TEAM, supra note 2, at 13. 
 15. Id. (noting Valdez is a small Alaskan town with a population of 4,000 and a small 
airstrip whose traffic jumped from ten flights a day to 1,000 during clean-up efforts). 
 16. Paine et al., supra note 13, at 202. 
 17. See EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL TRUSTEE COUNCIL, EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL 
RESTORATION PLAN: UPDATE ON INJURED RESOURCES AND SERVICES 10–11 (Nov. 2006) 
(noting that the productivity rates of the Black Oystercatcher decreased with the onset of clean-up 
efforts). 
 18. NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, SUMMARIES OF SIGNIFICANT 
U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL SPILLS, 1967–1991, REPORT NO. HMRAD 92–11  (1992). 
 19. DAVID LEBEDOFF, CLEANING UP: THE STORY BEHIND THE BIGGEST LEGAL BONANZA 
OF OUR TIME 10–11 (The Free Press 1997). 
 20. Id. at 10. 
 21. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2612 (2008) (“Its captain 
was one Joseph Hazelwood, who had completed a 28-day alcohol treatment program while 
employed by Exxon, as his superiors knew, but dropped out of a prescribed follow-up program 
and stopped going to Alcoholics Anonymous meetings.”); see also Investigator Testifies of 
Smelling Alcohol on Hazelwood’s Breath, N.Y. TIMES , Feb. 17, 1990, at 13; but see  Tanker’s 
Captain Seemed Sober, Pilot Tells Court, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1990, at A17 (describing testimony 
that Hazelwood did not seem intoxicated).  See generally LEBEDOFF, supra note 19, at 1–17 
(providing an interesting narrative on the incident). 
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two officers on the bridge at any time).22  Already fatigued from his first shift, 
Cousins began an unscheduled second shift at midnight and also retreated from 
the bridge to complete navigational calculations.23  Just after midnight, only 
the helmsman was on the bridge—minutes later, when the vessel did not turn 
quickly enough, the vessel directly struck Bligh Reef.24  The oil spilled rapidly, 
and Exxon’s liability rapidly stacked up. 
The National Transportation Safety Board conducted an official 
investigation of the disaster.25  The agency concluded that several factors 
contributed to the probable cause: 
[T]he failure of the third mate [Cousins] to properly maneuver the vessel 
because of fatigue and excessive work load; the failure of the master 
[Hazelwood] to provide a proper navigation watch because of impairment from 
alcohol; the  failure of Exxon Shipping Company to provide a fit master and a 
rested and sufficient crew for the Exxon Valdez; the lack of an effective Vessel 
Traffic Service because of inadequate equipment and manning levels, 
inadequate personnel training, and deficient management oversight; and a lack 
of pilotage services.26 
Despite significant cleanup efforts, the incident’s impact on the 
environment, wildlife, and commerce remains, even after almost twenty 
years.27  Some beaches are still polluted with oil, showing little and slowing 
change over the past decade.28  In addition to the hundreds of thousands of 
animals that died immediately following the spill, some entire species are still 
“not recovering.”29  Even the commercial fishing industry has not recovered,30 
an injury constituting many of the private legal claims against Exxon.31 
 
 22. LEBEDOFF, supra note 19, at 13–15. 
 23. Id. at 13–14. 
 24. Id. at 15. 
 25. Jim Hall, Chairman, Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., Remarks at the Wash. Traffic Safety 
Comm’n Symposium on Driver Fatigue (Nov. 21, 1996), http://www.ntsb.gov/speeches/former/ 
hall/jh961121.htm (discussing the National Transportation Safety Board’s official findings).  See 
also NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., MARINE ACCIDENT REPORT: GROUNDING OF THE U.S. 
TANKSHIP EXXON VALDEZ ON BLIGH REEF, PRINCE WILLIAM SOUND, NEAR VALDEZ, ALASKA, 
NTSB/MAR-90/04 (Mar. 24, 1989).  The report is available for purchase through the National 
Technical Information Service at http://www.ntis.gov/search/product.aspx?ABBR=PB90916405. 
 26. Hall, supra note 25. 
 27. See EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL TRUSTEE COUNCIL, supra note 17, at 9.  In fact, the 
impact on the environment has not significantly changed over the past decade.  See, e.g., Sam 
Howe Verhovek, Across 10 Years, Exxon Valdez Casts a Shadow, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1999, at 
A1 (noting that in 1999 only two species affected by the accident had recovered). 
 28. Jeffrey W. Short et al., Slightly Weathered Exxon Valdez Oil Persists in Gulf of Alaska 
Beach Sediments After 16 Years, 41 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 1245, 1245 (2007) (noting that in 2001, 
an estimated 100 tons of oil remained on the beaches). 
 29. EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL TRUSTEE COUNCIL, supra note 17, at 6 tbl.1. 
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The extensive and diverse consequences of the accident gave rise to 
compound litigation.  The United States government and private plaintiffs sued 
Exxon and particular employees in both criminal and civil contexts.32  In sum, 
eighty plaintiff law firms litigated competing claims that required two hundred 
experts, one thousand depositions, almost twenty million documents, and $5.3 
billion in verdicts and settlements.33  The original 1994 civil judgment alone 
awarded $5 billion in punitive damages to 34,000 fishermen and other 
plaintiffs who claimed economic injury from the incident.34  These facts 
illustrate the incident’s magnitude and the intertwining interests which add 
color to the case’s procedural posture. 
II.  HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
A. “Trial Phases”: The District Court’s Organization of Parties and 
Liabilities 
Exxon’s legal liability stemming from its 1989 incident touched both 
criminal and civil law.35  Exxon was charged under several United States 
environmental laws, attaching a $25 million fine plus $150 million in 
restitution.36  The U.S. also sought civil liability against Exxon, which entered 
a consent decree that Exxon would pay a minimum of $900 million toward the 
restoration of natural resources.37  Additionally, Exxon’s settlements with 
private parties such as fishermen totaled another $303 million.38 
 
 30. Id. at 35 (“[C]ommercial fishing, as a lost or reduced service, is in the process of 
recovering from the effects of the oil spill, but full recovery has not been achieved.”). 
 31. In fact, Exxon had already fully compensated for the harm to the environment; the 
punitive damages at stake in Exxon were to be paid directly to commercial fishermen whose 
livelihoods suffered as a result of this incident.   Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. ___, 128 
S. Ct. 2605, 2611 (2008). 
 32. See id. at 2613.  See also Keith Schneider, Tenacious Lawyer Turns Exxon Spill Into 
Pollution Case for the Ages, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1994, at B7 (“About 15,000 fishermen and 
other Alaskan plaintiffs sued Exxon, asserting that the spill had destroyed their livelihoods.”). 
 33. N. Robert Stoll, Litigating and Managing a Mass Disaster Case: An Oregon Plaintiff 
Lawyer’s Experience in the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Litigation, OR. ST. B. BULL., Oct. 1995, at 14, 
15. 
 34. Keith Schneider, Exxon is Ordered to Pay $5 Billion for Alaska Spill, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
17, 1994, at 1.  For a discussion on the competing interests and injuries, see Laura Mansnerus, 
Business and the Law; A Paper Spill Due in the Valdez Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1990, at D2. 
 35. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2613 (2008). 
 36. Id. (noting Exxon pleaded guilty to violations of the Clean Water Act, Refuse Act of 
1899, and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
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But many of the civil cases failed to settle and continued through 
litigation.39  The district court divided the remaining plaintiffs, all of whom 
sought compensatory damages, into three classes: (1) commercial fishermen; 
(2) Native Alaskans; and (3) landowners.40  The same district court also 
certified a mandatory class of plaintiffs seeking punitive damages, collectively 
known as Baker, which totaled 32,000 individuals.41  After Exxon stipulated its 
negligence and liability for compensatory damages, the ensuing trial was 
subsequently divided into three phases.42 
The “trial phase” design allowed for clarity and organization of Exxon’s 
liability given that plaintiffs suffered injury in varied degrees.43  Phase I 
determined that the conduct of Exxon and Captain Hazelwood was reckless, 
for which the court attached punitive liability on both Exxon and Hazelwood.44  
Phase II focused on the compensatory damages owed to commercial fishermen 
and Native Alaskans.45  While the jury award totaled $287 million in 
compensatory damages to commercial fishermen, this amount was drastically 
decreased to $19 million after the court deducted settlements and released 
claims.46  Phase III triggered the actual calculation of punitive damages for 
which Exxon and Hazelwood would each be liable.47  During Phase III, 
evidence was introduced regarding the relevant acts and omissions of Exxon’s 
management demonstrating the degree to which punitive liability should be 
imposed on the defendants.48  The jury returned punitive damage awards 
against both parties: an award of $5 billion against Exxon and $5,000 against 
Captain Hazelwood.49 
 
 39. See id. (noting that the “remaining civil cases were consolidated into” one case against 
Exxon, Hazelwood, and others). 
 40. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2613. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Keith Schneider, First Decision of Exxon Valdez Trial Is Expected in Days, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 13, 1994, at B8. 
 44. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2614.  Additionally, Captain Hazelwood was sentenced to 1000 
hours of community service divided over five years for his involvement in the accident.  Exxon 
Valdez Captain Starts Community Service, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1999, at A23 (noting 
Hazelwood’s community work involved collecting abandoned car parts from the roadside). 
 45.  Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2614. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. 
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B. Ninth Circuit Rejects Exxon’s Multifaceted Appeal Regarding Punitive 
Liability 
On appeal, Exxon objected not only to the amount of punitive damages the 
court awarded, but also to being held punitively liable at all.50  Exxon waged 
its argument on several fronts, none of which was persuasive to the Ninth 
Circuit.51  First, Exxon contested its punitive liability, arguing that expenses 
for the cleanup and criminal and civil sanctions already served as adequate 
punishment and deterrence from future conduct.52  Exxon forcefully claimed 
that Exxon’s payments for cleanup and sanctions already met the twin aims of 
punitive liability—to punish and deter—making it unnecessary to punish and 
deter further.53  Yet the court disagreed and stated that, as a general rule, prior 
criminal sanctions do not bar punitive damages and, furthermore, that Exxon 
presented no precedent to substantiate its policy argument.54 
Exxon also contended that, in any event, punitive damages were flatly 
prohibited in admiralty law.55  Unfortunately for Exxon, it again failed to 
persuade the Ninth Circuit that punitive liability was barred because, as the 
court indicated, punitive damages are indeed appropriate in maritime under 
certain circumstances.56  The court dismissed this argument with brevity, only 
impliedly indicating that any of these circumstances were applicable to Exxon 
in the present case.57 
In sum, Exxon and Baker cross-appealed several times; a central concern 
was the amount of punitive damages, which were to vindicate “the public 
interest in punishing harm to the environment.”58  The punitive damages were 
reduced from the original $5 billion to $4 billion, increased from $4 billion to 
$4.5 billion, again reduced from $4.5 billion to $2.5 billion, and ultimately, 
 
 50.  In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1225 (9th Cir. 2001), vacated, 554 U.S. ___, 128 S. 
Ct. 2605 (2008). 
 51.  Id. at 1246–47 (holding that punitive damages were appropriate but excessive). 
 52. Id. at 1225.  See Joint Reply Brief and Joint Answering Brief of Exxon Corp. and Exxon 
Shipping Co. at 1, In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2001), vacated, 554 U.S. ___, 128 
S.Ct. 2605 (2008) (Nos. 97-35191 & 97-35193) (“Exxon’s $3.5 billion in spill-related costs and 
expenses was enough to deter anyone from anything.  And Exxon’s post-spill changes in 
procedures demonstrate that deterrence was accomplished in fact”). 
 53.  In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1225. 
 54.  Id. at 1226. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. at 1226 n.14 (“Although rarely imposed, punitive damages have long been 
recognized as an available remedy in general maritime actions where defendant’s intentional or 
wanton and reckless conduct amounted to a conscious disregard of the rights of others.”) (citation 
omitted). 
 57.  Id. at 1226. 
 58.  In re Exxon Valdez, 472 F.3d 600, 601 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted), amended by 
490 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2007), vacated, 554 U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 2605 (2008). 
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drastically cut to $507.5 million by the Supreme Court.59  Plaintiffs from all 
classes were naturally disappointed by each reduction, as these punitive 
damages were specifically earmarked to compensate them for their economic 
losses.60  At the time of its final plea to the Supreme Court, Exxon posted its 
largest-ever quarterly income of $11.68 billion while it faced already-reduced 
punitive damages remaining at $2.5 billion.61 
III.  DIVIDED SUPREME COURT 
A. Circuit Split Foreshadows Split Court on Exxon’s Liability for 
Hazelwood’s Actions 
The first issue the Court addressed was whether the district court correctly 
instructed the jury that “a corporation ‘is responsible for the reckless acts 
of . . . employees . . . in a managerial capacity while acting in the scope of their 
employment.’”62  Exxon relied on maritime precedent from 200 years ago in 
asserting that a ship owner cannot be liable for punitive damages due to its 
shipmaster’s recklessness.63  It claimed that the jury instructions, as given, 
wrongfully operated “[to tell] the jury that Exxon must be deemed reckless 
solely on account of Hazelwood’s reckless acts whether or not those acts 
violated properly enforced corporate policies.”64  As such, Exxon claimed that 
it was inappropriate to premise punitive damages on a theory of vicarious 
liability solely for the conduct of its agent. 
The Court acknowledged that this form of vicarious liability is barred in 
some federal circuits and that the circuits are nonetheless split.65  With shallow 
discussion on this issue, the Justices noted they were split, thus owing full 
deference to the Ninth Circuit’s decision to allow punitive damages based on 
the corporate liability theory.66  While this did not create precedent on the 
 
 59.  Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2634 (2008); In re Exxon 
Valdez, 472 F.3d 600 at 602  (summarizing procedural history). 
 60. Fishermen Express Dismay over Exxon Valdez Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2001, at 
A20. 
 61. Clifford Krauss, Exxon’s Second-Quarter Earnings Set a Record, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 
2008, at C2.  This profit set other records as well—it was the “best quarterly profit ever for a 
corporation . . . .”  Id. 
 62. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. 2605 at 2615 (citations omitted). 
 63. Brief for the Petitioners at 18, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 
2605 (2008) (No. 07-219). 
 64. Id. at 26. 
 65. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2615.  The Court noted that some circuits—but not all—have 
adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts rule.  Id. at 2615 n.4.  Compare In re Exxon Valdez, 
270 F.3d 1215, 1235 (9th Cir. 2001) (adopting the Restatement rule), with CEH, Inc. v. F/V 
Seafarer, 70 F.3d 694, 705 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding the Restatement rule not applicable to the 
case). 
 66. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2616. 
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Supreme Court’s part, it did allow for the analysis to proceed through the 
remaining issues of punitive liability. 
B. Exxon Again Argues Statutory Remedy Preemption . . . To No Avail 
Throughout litigation, Exxon consistently used the Clean Water Act 
(“CWA”) to argue that the CWA statutorily preempted the availability of 
punitive damages.67  Exxon’s argument, specifically, was that the CWA’s 
provisions preempted any maritime punitive damages because it was a statute 
“not addressed to compensation for private harms, but instead prescribes a 
comprehensive, calibrated scheme of public enforcement . . . .”68  This public 
enforcement, according to Exxon, was a remedy sufficient in itself, thereby 
precluding punitive damages for civil liability to private parties for conduct 
within this statute.69 
The Court disagreed on the merits of this argument.70  The CWA, it 
explained, did not preempt remedies—compensatory and punitive damages 
especially—to the degree Exxon argued: it was not “intended to eliminate sub 
silentio oil companies’ common law duties to refrain from injuring the bodies 
and livelihoods of private individuals.”71  If this were the case, the statute 
would directly or clearly express a congressional intent to preempt the field or 
destroy the common law duty.72  In affirming the Ninth Circuit, the Court 
concluded that even if such preemption could be indirectly construed or 
implied, that alone was not enough to abridge a common-law principle such as 
punitive liability.73  Having decided that punitive damages were appropriate in 
the instant maritime case, and not preempted by any federal statute, the Court 
proceeded to the main event: Exxon’s outstanding punitive damages. 
 
 67. Id. at 2617 (citations omitted).  The Clean Water Act is designed to protect waterways 
and prevent their pollution.  33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2006). 
 68. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 63, at 40. 
 69. Id. at 40–41. 
 70. The Court noted that there were two interpretations of Exxon’s argument.  Exxon, 128 S. 
Ct. at 2618.  The first was that any tort action premised on an oil spill is preempted unless it is 
saved by the statute and the second was that only punitive damages—but not compensatory 
damages—would be preempted.  Id. at 2618–19.  The Court indicated that congressional intent 
and statutory language disproved both theories.  Id. at 2619. 
 71. Id. at 2619.  In making this determination, the Court considered that the CWA 
“expressly” protects “water” and “shorelines” as a statute with these aims would not eliminate 
such duties of oil companies.  Id. (“All in all, we see no clear indication of congressional intent to 
occupy the entire field of pollution remedies.”). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id.  The Ninth Circuit provided a thorough analysis on this preemption, though it is 
beyond the scope of this Note.  See In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1228–31 (analyzing the 
statutory preemption of the common law punitive damages remedy). 
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C. Exxon Majority Prescribes a Bright-Line Limitation on Punitive Damages 
The heart of Exxon’s appeal was the arguably large size of the punitive 
damages award, standing at $2.5 billion after it had been twice reduced in the 
Ninth Circuit.74  Exxon contested the Ninth Circuit’s “evasion” of this issue, 
claiming that this award was inappropriate given that “plaintiffs . . . received 
full compensation [and] deterrence and punishment ha[d] been fully 
achieved.”75  Exxon asserted that substantive admiralty law limited the 
punitive damages above and beyond implicit constitutional limits.76  This 
limitation should exist, Exxon argued, because the underlying policy rationale 
that tends to support punitive damages did not properly support the policies in 
the instant context: 
Such awards penalize maritime commerce rather than protect it; they expand 
rather than limit liability; they are unpredictable and inconsistent; they have 
nothing to do with compensation for actual injury; and they impede rather than 
promote settlement and judicial economy.77 
Exxon alternatively contended that punitive damages were wholly unavailable 
because the public interest of awarding punitive damages for punishment and 
deterrence was “fully achieved” given the criminal and civil sanctions the 
previous courts imposed on Exxon.78  Such sanctions were “enough to deter 
anyone from anything” and did not support the judicial aims of uniformity or 
predictability.79 
As a traditional last resort, however, Exxon argued that even if punitive 
damages were not wholly inappropriate, the Court should alternatively adopt a 
standard for what qualifies as an appropriate award of punitive damages in 
admiralty law.80  Exxon suggested to the Court several such standards that 
either existed in current maritime law or were otherwise consistent with it.81  
Among those alternatives identified: punitive damages should not exceed those 
prescribed by Congress;82 punitive damages should not exceed substantial 
 
 74. In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1246–47 (order to remand from $5 billion); In re Exxon 
Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1110 (D. Alaska 2004) (reducing punitive damages from $5 billion 
to $4.5 billion); In re Exxon Valdez, 490 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2007) (reducing the award 
from $4.5 billion to $2.5 billion due to mitigating factors such as Exxon’s “prompt action . . . to 
clean up the oil and to compensate the plaintiffs . . . .”). 
 75. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 63, at 44. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 46–47. 
 78. Id. at 48. 
 79. Id. at 49. 
 80. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 63, at 50 (warning the Court of “game-show 
mentality” where juries award “whatever they will” absent such guideposts of appropriateness). 
 81. Id. at 51. 
 82. Id. 
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compensatory damages;83 punitive damages should not exceed that which is 
required to remove any profit from wrongful conduct that is likely detected;84 
and juries may not consider the net worth of corporate defendants in awarding 
punitive damages.85 
The Exxon Court dismissed the argument that punitive damages were 
wholly unavailable but agreed that a limitation on punitive damages in 
admiralty law would be reasonable.86  After articulating a brief history and 
rationale for punitive damages,87 the Court indicated the “real problem” with 
punitive damages was their “stark unpredictability.”88  The undesirable 
unpredictability of punitive damages guided the majority’s discussion.89  The 
Court dismissed several studies that examined the erratic character of jury-
awarded punitive damages as insignificant; though these studies identified 
“reasonable” statistical means of the size of punitive damage awards, the 
means are the result of awards of extreme high and low amounts rather than 
amounts that hover near the statistical mean.90  Encouraging predictability was 
the cornerstone of the Court’s assessment of creating appropriate limitations. 
Traditionally, the Court has given only constitutional treatment to “outlier” 
punitive damages.91  Limiting punitive damages from a constitutional 
foundation requires assessment under the Due Process Clause and “prohibits 
the imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor.”92  
This prohibition is squarely based on the notion that “a person receive fair 
notice . . . of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose.”93  Punitive 
damages that may be considered excessive or unreasonable become 
 
 83. Id. at 52. 
 84. Id. at 53. 
 85. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 63, at 54. 
 86. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2629 (2008) 
(discussing possible limits on punitive damages in admiralty law). 
 87. Id. at 2620–25.  Punitive damages are aimed primarily at retribution and deterrence, 
whereas compensatory damages compensate injured parties for actual harm.  See Cooper Indus., 
Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001) (“[Compensatory damages] are 
intended to redress the concrete loss that the plaintiff has suffered by reason of the defendant’s 
wrongful conduct.  [Punitive damages], which have been described as ‘quasi-criminal,’ operate as 
‘private fines’ intended to punish the defendant and to deter future wrongdoing.”) (citations 
omitted). 
 88. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2625. 
 89. Id. at 2625–26 (noting that the vast difference between low and high awards was most 
worrisome). 
 90. Id.  The Court acknowledged that it was unaware of any study demonstrating that 
punitive damages are consistent across “similar claims and circumstances.” Id. at 2626. 
 91. Id. at 2626.  See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 
(2003) (“[F]ew awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory 
damages . . . will satisfy due process.”). 
 92. State Farm Mut., 538 U.S. at 416. 
 93. BMW of N. America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996). 
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unpredictable; this unpredictability deprives defendants of Fifth Amendment 
fair notice of consequences for unlawful behavior. 
Exxon thus presented the Court with a novel question when it contested a 
punitive damages award in federal maritime law.  Certainly, constitutional 
safeguards were entirely relevant (and mandatory), but in this instance the 
Court had the opportunity to go beyond a settled constitutional principle and 
create a more stringent law.94  Flowing from the Court’s previous evaluation of 
punitive damages awards as unpredictable, the Court aimed to have a penalty 
that was “reasonably predictable,” allowing actors to make informed decisions 
when engaging in unlawful behavior and feel “threaten[ed]” by penalties 
imposed upon previous, similarly situated actors.95 
To achieve a limitation that would engraft predictability into the punitive 
damage system of maritime law, the Justices considered pre-existing 
approaches in state law.96  This posed a difficult and subjective task for the 
Court as there is great “difficulty in determining when the dollar amount of 
punitive damages crosses the line and becomes excessive.”97  Exxon 
considered three approaches—one that was qualitative (verbal) and two that 
were quantitative.98  A qualitative limitation establishes a guideline premised 
upon factors from which the factfinder determines an appropriate amount of 
damages; there is no hard and fast monetary “cap.”99  In Gore, for instance, the 
Supreme Court identified three “guideposts” to aid the punitive damages 
determination: (1) “the degree of reprehensibility” of the conduct;100 (2) the 
ratio between compensatory damages for actual harm and the punitive 
damages;101 and (3) which typical sanctions exist for “comparable 
 
 94. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2627 (“Whatever may be the constitutional significance of the 
unpredictability of high punitive awards, this feature of happenstance is in tension with the 
function of the awards as punitive, just because of the implication of unfairness that an 
eccentrically high punitive verdict carries in a system whose commonly held notion of law rests 
on a sense of fairness in dealing with one another.”). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 2627–28 (surveying state policies toward limiting punitive damages). 
 97. Leo M. Romero, Punitive Damages, Criminal Punishment, and Proportionality: The 
Importance of Legislative Limits, 41 CONN. L. REV. 109, 139 (2008). 
 98. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2627. 
 99. See, e.g., BMW of N. America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574–75 (1996).  See also 
TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 457 (1993) (noting that the process juries 
use to determine punitive damages is qualitative because they must consider “a host of facts and 
circumstances unique to the particular case . . . .”); Michael A. Nelson, Constitutional Limits on 
Punitive Damages: How Much Is Too Much?, 23 ME. B.J. 42, 42–43 (2008) (claiming that the 
TXO Prod. Corp. qualitative test is an “I know it when I see it” test). 
 100. BMW, 517 U.S. at 575. 
 101. Id. at 580. 
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misconduct.”102 Conversely, a quantitative limitation imposes a monetary cap, 
generally existing as a ratio between punitive damages and actual damages or 
as an actual monetary amount that no punitive damage award can exceed. 
The Court expressly favored a quantitative analyses over qualitative with 
the aim of crafting a rule that would generate consistency and predictability 
while operating efficiently toward retribution and deterrence.103  A qualitative 
limitation, the Court indicated, was more likely to result in unpredictable 
application and outlier amounts.104  In choosing between a quantitative 
standard that would establish a proportion and one that would enforce a 
monetary cap, the Court valued two factors: the nature of the claim—tort and 
contract—and the nature of judicial lawmaking.105  There exists no “standard” 
injury in either contract or tort law because what may be an appropriate 
“maximum” penalty for one set of facts may be entirely inappropriate under 
another set.106  Unlike a legislative body, which would have the opportunity to 
occasionally revisit a monetary cap to adjust it for inflation or other concerns, a 
court “cannot say when an issue will show up on the docket again.”107  To 
avoid establishing precedent that may not be revisited for some time to come, 
the Court opted for a proportional limitation which would effectively operate 
as a variable maximum with its amount bearing only on the compensatory 
damages awarded. 
With those concerns in mind, the Exxon Court sifted through varying 
proportions to determine how to consistently limit punitive damages while 
accounting for the unique nature of every case.  Because compensatory 
damages compensate for the actual harm, it is fair to tie retribution and 
deterrence to that amount.108  The Court found support and validation for this 
approach in state law as well as in limited areas of federal legislation.109  
 
 102. Id. at 583.  In his dissent, Justice Scalia complained that these “guideposts” were a “road 
to nowhere [and] they provide no real guidance at all.”  Id. at 605 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Several 
states use qualitative analyses of punitive damages as well.  See, e.g., U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Mayor 
of Baltimore, 647 A.2d 405, 424–25 (Md. 1994) (reflecting several factors for the jury to consider 
in determining punitive damages, such as deterrence and wrongfulness of conduct). 
 103. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2628 (implying quantitative limits may not impose a standard any 
more rigorous than current due process). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 2629. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2629.  The Court regarded the relevance of compensatory damages 
as inherent in the due process analysis.  See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 
538 U.S. 408, 409 (2003). 
 109. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2629 (noting that treble damages in federal antitrust and patent are 
controlled by compensatory damage awards). 
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Absent federal maritime law on a single issue, it is not uncommon for courts 
sitting in admiralty to “borrow” from state law.110 
While Exxon dismissed other studies that discussed the average actual 
awarded amount of punitive damages, for the purposes of dictating a 
proportion, it valued another study which assessed damage amounts juries and 
judges regarded as reasonable awards.111  The median ratio of all 
circumstances (from conduct ranging from negligent to malicious) fell at 
below 1:1—that is, in most cases, punitive damages were generally regarded as 
reasonable when they were less than corresponding compensatory damages.112  
Cases such as Exxon, where intention, malice, or primary purpose of personal 
gain is lacking, have a statistical median ratio of 0.65:1 (punitive to 
compensatory).113  The Court drew a more generous line at 1:1—punitive 
damages could no longer outweigh compensatory damages in federal maritime 
cases where intent is no more than reckless.114 
Principles of admiralty law and constitutional law supported this 1:1 ratio.  
The Clean Water Act, for example, permitted a maximum daily penalty for 
polluting of $25,000 for negligent violations and $50,000 for polluting with 
knowledge.115  Under the due process limitations on punitive damages, the 
Supreme Court had previously indicated that single-digit ratio maximums are 
almost always appropriate.116  Because the Court found that in Exxon the 
punitive damages were appropriate but excessive, the Court swiftly remanded 
the case, imposing for the first time its 1:1 bright-line limitation on punitive 
damages. 
D. Three Justices, Three Dissents: A Legislative—Not Judicial—
Determination in Maritime Law 
Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer challenged both the present and 
future applicability of the Exxon rule in their respective dissents.  Justice 
Stevens largely relied on principles of maritime law and the importance of 
legislative history; Justice Ginsburg discussed the limitation’s unreliability; 
Justice Breyer advocated affirmation of the award, citing a number of district 
and appeals courts which had condoned the award’s reasonableness. 
 
 110. Robert Force, Essay on Federal Common Law and Admiralty, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1367, 
1374 (1999) (“[S]tate law has been influential in the development of federal maritime law . . . .”). 
 111. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2632–33. 
 112. Id. at 2633. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (2006); Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2634. 
 116. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2634 (2008).  See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 
U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (noting that when compensatory damages are “substantial” a smaller ratio 
may be desirable). 
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1. Justice Stevens: Not Our Rule to Make 
In his dissent, Justice Stevens did not outright rebut the limitation on 
punitive damages, but rather, took issue with its birth in the judiciary instead of 
in the legislature.117  In articulating this, Justice Stevens distinguished federal 
maritime law from other law on the basis that “maritime tort law is now 
dominated by federal statute.”118  Given that Congress is the primary author of 
maritime law, its affirmative decision to not limit punitive damages requires 
“judicial restraint” in limiting remedies.119  Justice Stevens relied on an 
important distinction that the majority opinion largely disregarded: the 
consequence of the lack of legislative restriction on maritime tort damages.120  
Justice Stevens cited other areas in which statutes have shielded ship owners 
from liability, indicating that Congress exercises its power in limiting remedies 
only when it sees fit, and absent this intent, it is not the Court’s responsibility 
to supply it.121  In fact, Justice Stevens criticized the majority for failing to 
identify any state court that has adopted an equally precise ratio.122  He 
likewise noted that state legislatures, not courts, have adopted a limitation that 
resembles Exxon.123  Justice Stevens thus advocated that Congress was the 
competent body to “assess the empirical data, and to balance competing policy 
interests . . . .”124 
Justice Stevens further faulted the majority for failing to consider the 
unique nature of admiralty law and its remedial schemes by instead misplacing 
its reliance on empirical data from land-based legal remedies.125  Unlike other 
bodies of law, he noted, compensatory damages are limited in general maritime 
law.126  In their modernized form, punitive damages generally serve no 
compensatory function; but because compensatory damages are often limited 
under admiralty law, courts employ punitive damages to supplement 
compensatory damages.127 So punitive damages may be awarded differently in 
maritime than in the land-tort context to account for those injuries which 
maritime law refuses to award compensatory damages (i.e. purely financial or 
 
 117. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2634 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 118. Id. at 2635 (internal citations omitted). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 2635–36 (referring to the Limitation of Shipowners’ Liability Act, which shields 
shipowners from liability when charged with wrongdoing committed without their knowledge). 
 122. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2636 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 123. Id. at 2637. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 2636–37. 
 126. Id. at 2636.  See generally Brandon T. Morris, Oil, Money, and the Environment: 
Punitive Damages Under Due Process, Preemption, and Maritime Law in the Wake of the Exxon 
Valdez Litigation, 33 TUL. MAR. L.J. 165 (2008). 
 127. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2637 (2008). 
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emotional harm).128  An underlying premise in the studies the majority relied 
on was that compensation had already accounted for actual harm, so punitive 
damages must only deter and punish.  Naturally, whether injured parties have 
been compensated is a key consideration that will change what a judge or jury 
considers a “reasonable” award. 
Justice Stevens concluded that the Court should have reviewed Exxon for 
“abuse of discretion” (the general standard) rather than applying a strict, 
quantitative value.129  If the Court’s primary concern was large outlier awards, 
he reasoned, reviewing them for an abuse of discretion would sufficiently 
eliminate such troublesome awards.130  Under this standard, the award should 
have been affirmed: 
In light of Exxon’s decision to permit a lapsed alcoholic to command a 
supertanker carrying tens of millions of gallons of crude oil through the 
treacherous waters of Prince William Sound, thereby endangering all of the 
individuals who depended upon the sound for their livelihoods, the jury could 
reasonably have given expression to its “moral condemnation” of Exxon’s 
conduct in the form of this award.131 
Justice Stevens believed that although the Court had the power to limit 
damages, “it errs in doing so.”132 
2. Justice Ginsburg: No Limiting the Limit’s Application 
Justice Ginsburg’s reservation from joining the majority centered on the 
bright-line rule with lines that were too ambiguous.133  It was unclear, she felt, 
whether this limitation on punitive damages would be applicable only in 
admiralty law or whether it signaled a broader constitutional limitation, as 
well.134  The implication of this distinction is clear: Which courts will be 
bound to this rule?  If the Supreme Court does not know, how will a lower 
court fearing appellate review know when it must limit available punitive 
damages?  Compounding this issue was the majority’s reliance on limiting 
damages based upon the degree of reprehensibility of the conduct (applying it 
only where conduct is reckless).135  Justice Ginsburg noted that while the 
majority indicated that reprehensibility affected the limitation, it did not clearly 
 
 128. Id. (“[P]unitive damages may serve to compensate for certain sorts of intangible injuries 
not recoverable under the rubric of compensation.”). 
 129. Id. at 2638. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2638 (2008). 
 133. Id. at 2639 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 134. Id. (“[I]s the Court holding only that 1:1 is the maritime-law ceiling, or is it also 
signaling that any ratio higher than 1:1 will be held to exceed ‘the constitutional outer limit?’”) 
(emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
 135. Id. 
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identify how it did so.136  If courts must limit punitive damages to 
compensatory damages when the conduct was reckless, it is unclear how they 
should limit punitive damages when the conduct is intentional—or worse, 
malicious. 
Justice Ginsburg lamented that not only was the majority’s rule unclear 
and confusing, but it was also premature because it lacked “an urgent need.”137  
She highlighted the majority’s concession that traditional appellate review of 
punitive damages (a “reasonability” standard) had not yet resulted in “mass-
produced runaway awards.” 138  She thus laid her final argument on the point 
that absent an immediate problem the rule was excessive and premature.  
Justice Ginsburg predicts that the Court will likely return to this issue in the 
near future to determine just how far this limitation will reach and whether this 
is, in fact, a constitutional limitation.139 
3. Justice Breyer: Deference Owed to the Many Lower Courts that 
Decided in Accord 
Justice Breyer dissented on the basis that each of the district courts’ awards 
was appropriate and adequately investigated.140  He noted that the 
reprehensibility of Exxon’s conduct indeed warranted severe punitive liability 
because “[t]he jury could reasonably have believed that Exxon knowingly 
allowed a relapsed alcoholic repeatedly to pilot a vessel filled with millions of 
gallons of oil through waters that provided the livelihood for the many 
plaintiffs in this case.”141  Those facts, he explained, made it reasonable for the 
jury to have attached steep punitive damages to Exxon’s conduct.142  
Reviewing courts, Justice Breyer noted, “engaged in an exacting review” 
multiple times, each with a “more penetrating inquiry” and even when 
confronted with the opportunity to conclude that the damages were 
unreasonable, the courts chose to maintain relatively similar amounts.143  
Despite the appellate remands to lower the award, every court below the 
Supreme Court still maintained a punitive damage award that was five times 
greater than the compensatory damages.144 
Justice Breyer, along with Justices Ginsburg and Stevens, would have 
affirmed the Ninth Circuit given the unique nature of admiralty law, the 
 
 136. Id. 
 137. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2639. 
 138. Id. (citations omitted). 
 139. Id. (“On next opportunity, will the Court rule, definitively, that 1:1 is the ceiling due 
process requires in all of the States, and for all federal claims?”). 
 140. Id. at 2640 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 141. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 142. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2639. 
 143. Id. (citations omitted). 
 144. Id. 
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reprehensibility of Exxon’s conduct, and the uncertain jurisprudential 
implications of the new bright line rule.145 
IV.  ANALYSIS OF OPINION 
A. Admiralty Law’s Circular Relationship with General Common Law 
The interaction between admiralty and common law is an important 
concept to understand because of the unique way in which admiralty law 
derives its jurisdiction and authority.  Admiralty law, which governs bodies of 
water, is a distinctive body of law—“an amalgam of traditional common-law 
rules, modifications of those rules, and newly created rules.”146  The 
jurisdiction of courts sitting in admiralty is generally “all waters, salt or fresh” 
which are “navigable in interstate or foreign water commerce . . . .”147  
Admiralty is also one of the few areas of “general” federal common law.148  
This is not to say that admiralty law exists as an island in the sea of law; in 
reality, there is a substantial relationship and dynamic interplay between the 
two bodies—though this relationship is arguably under-studied. 
Admiralty law is “aimed at providing the shipping industry with a uniform 
body of law.”149  As such, federal admiralty law is mandatory authority over 
cases of admiralty law.150  A frequent scenario subsequently arises when 
admiralty law is silent on an issue, as in Exxon.  In those cases, federal courts 
may—and do— “borrow state law” as long as no applicable federal admiralty 
law exists.151  It is therefore inevitable that state law is reinvented when federal 
courts sitting in admiralty borrow state law to resolve issues of first impression 
because federal courts reinterpret and reapply it in unprecedented manners.  As 
those new interpretations become precedent, their value evolves from purely 
persuasive into mandatory to be readopted by the same state courts that loaned 
the law in the first place. 
 
 145. Id. 
 146. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, 476 U.S. 858, 864–65 (1986). 
 147. GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 31–32 
(Foundation Press 2d ed. 1975). 
 148. Id. at 45–47. 
 149. Orgulf Transport Co. v. Hill’s Marine Enterprises, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1062 
(S.D. Ill. 2002). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id.  See also Continental Casualty Co. v. Anderson Excavating & Wrecking Co., 189 
F.3d 512, 519 (7th Cir. 1999) (“A federal court sitting in admiralty can, by analogy to the practice 
of the federal courts in regard to federal common law . . . , borrow the law of a state or a foreign 
country to resolve a dispute that had come into court under the admiralty jurisdiction, especially 
when dealing with a subject traditionally regulated by the states. . . .”). 
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B. East River:152  Supreme Court Borrows from State Common Law, Returns 
New Law 
Prior cases provide the strongest indication that the Exxon decision will 
serve as authority in traditional common law, though strictly speaking, the 
decision only governs maritime law.  This is best demonstrated through 
analogy by evaluating how general American courts have transposed Supreme 
Court precedent in admiralty into their decisions. 
In East River, the Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split 
regarding products liability in admiralty law.153  The Court determined as a 
threshold issue that products liability was an appropriate body of law under 
general maritime law.154  The more specific—and interesting—subject was 
whether a claim could be sustained when the only injury was to the product 
itself, constituting a purely economic loss.155  Without mandatory admiralty 
precedent to guide the Court’s determination, the Court instead surveyed state, 
land-based common law.156 
At one end was the majority rule that there can be no recovery for a purely 
economic injury because such recovery contradicts the public policy guiding 
products liability theory.157  Products liability aims to protect consumers by 
encouraging manufacturers to fix defects which may cause bodily harm 
regardless of their intent or negligence; under this principle, if resulting harm is 
only economic and not bodily, the public policy to hold manufacturers liable 
diminishes.158  But unlike the majority view, the minority approach extends the 
duty of manufacturers to produce non-defective products to all instances, even 
when the only resulting harm is purely economic or only to the product 
itself.159  The East River Court found both approaches “unsatisfactory,” 
because in reality, purely economic injuries resemble contract claims given 
that the purchaser is solely deprived the “benefit of its bargain.”160  Warranty 
law, not tort claims for negligence or strict liability, provided the appropriate 
and sufficient remedy.161  Accordingly, the East River Court held that 
 
 152. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, 476 U.S. 858 (1986). 
 153. Id. at 863. 
 154. Id. at 865–66 (noting that strict liability has been long recognized relating to injuries of 
workers at sea). 
 155. Id. at 866. 
 156. Id. at 868–70. 
 157. E. River, 476 U.S. at 868. 
 158. See Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 626 F.2d 280, 284–85 
(3d Cir. 1980).  For a discussion of the economic loss doctrine and East River, see Christopher 
Scott D’Angelo, The Economic Loss Doctrine: Saving Contract Warranty Law from Drowning in 
a Sea of Torts, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 591 (1995). 
 159. E. River, 476 U.S. at 868–69. 
 160. Id. at 870. 
 161. Id. at 872–74. 
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commercial manufacturers do not have any duty to prevent products from 
harming themselves;162 consumers may sue only under contract law when 
those products harm only themselves.163 
Though East River was decided in the context of admiralty law, general 
courts took notice of the Supreme Court’s decision.  A minority of courts 
distinguished their cases from East River, citing differences arising from 
governing state law or factual distinctions.164  Most notable was the 
overwhelming response by courts sitting in land law to adopt and follow the 
East River doctrine.  As the Third Circuit noted a year after East River, “We 
now predict that Pennsylvania courts, although not bound to do so, would 
nevertheless adopt as state law the Supreme Court’s reasoning in East 
River.”165 In fact, state courts eagerly adopted the reasoning espoused in East 
River.166  The policy supporting the East River holding has largely been the 
reason that courts have adopted the rule, despite its firm context in admiralty 
law.167  Simply put, when the Supreme Court’s reasoning transcends one area 
of law, courts of all areas will take notice. 
In sum, East River stands for the proposition that just as the common law 
of land influences admiralty law, so too will doctrines of admiralty law impact 
land law.168  It is a valid presumption, then, that the Exxon rule will work its 
way into the general common law despite its original foundation in admiralty 
law. 
 
 162. Id. at 871. 
 163. Id. at 872. 
 164. See Alaskan Oil, Inc. v. Cent. Flying Serv., Inc., 975 F.2d 553, 555 (8th Cir. 1992) 
(“Arkansas law permits recovery under strict liability even when the only damages sustained are 
to the defective product itself.”). 
 165. Aloe Coal Co. v. Clark Equip. Co., 816 F.2d 110, 111–12 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that 
fire damage to a product was not recoverable and that warranty law provided the appropriate 
claim). 
 166. See Mt. Lebanon Pers. Care Home, Inc. v. Hoover Universal, Inc., 276 F.3d 845, 848 
(6th Cir. 2002) (“A large majority of jurisdictions in this country have adopted the economic loss 
rule.”); Winchester v. Lester’s of Minnesota, Inc., 983 F.2d 992, 995 (10th Cir. 1993) (discussing 
two Kansas state appellate decisions following the reasoning of East River). 
 167. See Isla Nena Air Servs., Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 449 F.3d 85, 91 (1st Cir. 2006) 
(“Although East River is an admiralty case, and its decision is therefore not controlling in 
determining Puerto Rico law, we think the policy rationales explained by the Court logically 
apply to the decision we reach today.”) (emphasis added). 
 168. It should be reinforced that the application of these doctrines between admiralty and land 
law is persuasive—practitioners still require an understanding of how such authority has been 
adopted in their jurisdiction.  See generally Reeder R. Fox & Patrick J. Loftus, Riding the Choppy 
Waters of East River: Economic Loss Doctrine Ten Years Later, 64 DEF. COUNS. J. 260 (1997). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2009] A RULE OLD AND NEW, BORROWED AND BLUE 377 
C. Exxon Will Change the Landscape of Limitations on Punitive Damage 
Awards 
Exxon’s holding and related discourse will serve as precedent for 
American courts in varying ways.  Whether the holding will serve as 
mandatory or persuasive authority bears upon whether a court is reviewing 
punitive damages through the lens of due process or whether it is sitting in 
admiralty.169  As such, the holding’s impact can be loosely grouped in three 
categories: (1) relevant upon any American court facing a punitive liability due 
process issue; (2) mandatory upon any court sitting in admiralty with a reckless 
defendant’s punitive liability; and (3) persuasive upon common law courts 
reviewing excessive punitive damages. 
1. Exxon’s Due Process Discourse Will Affect Punitive Liability’s 
Constitutional Limits 
Even though the Court did not ascribe its bright-line rule as an express due 
process limitation, there is an implied possibility that it nonetheless signals the 
constitutional outer edge of punitive liability.  Justice Ginsburg was especially 
concerned with the uncertain application of this rule;170 even if it is a stretch to 
construe the rule as a constitutional limit in and of itself, it is very plausible 
that it marks the first step in this direction.  If in doubt, courts will be tempted 
to give the rule constitutional treatment even if they have not yet been called to 
do so. 
In its analysis, the majority stated that under the due process analysis, 
compensatory damages bear an “indisputable” relationship with the award of 
punitive damages.171  In its constitutional jurisprudence regarding punitive 
liability, this relationship has been a central consideration because the actual 
harm a defendant has caused is relevant to how the law should deter similar 
future conduct and punish that defendant.172  When the Court hints at what the 
constitutional limit should be without prescribing a set amount, courts have 
been inclined to decide their cases so as to comport with these implied 
limitations.  In cases predating Exxon, for example, a significant minority of 
 
 169. Courts that are not bound to the Exxon precedent may not consider the Exxon decision 
regardless of its persuasive value.  See Line v. Ventura, No. 1070736, 2009 WL 1425993, at *11 
(Ala. May 22, 2009) (declining to consider Exxon because of the Court’s express limitation that 
Exxon was an admiralty case). 
 170. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
 171. Id. at 2629. 
 172. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (noting 
that most punitive damages awards that satisfy due process generally bear a single-digit ratio with 
actual damages); BMW of N. America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 580–81 (1996) (“The 
principle that exemplary damages must bear a ‘reasonable relationship’ to compensatory damages 
has a long pedigree.”). 
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courts still reduced punitive damages based upon Supreme Court guideposts 
even though such guidance was purely subjective.173  Following State Farm, a 
notable number of courts even reduced punitive damages to match 
compensatory damages, though there was no mandate that punitive damages 
had to conform to compensatory damages.174 
To prevent future judgments from improperly engrafting the Exxon bright-
line rule into the constitutional analysis, the Court’s own precedent may be the 
best safeguard it has.  In Gore, for example, the Court detailed hypothetical 
situations in which punitive damages and compensatory damages should bear 
no relationship on one another; such a situation may arise when “a particularly 
egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages” such 
that a court should properly give punitive damages greater weight than 
compensatory damages.175  In these opinions, the Court hints that punitive 
liability is best decided on a case-by-case basis, and that it cannot “draw a 
mathematical bright line between the constitutionally acceptable and the 
constitutionally unacceptable that would fit every case.”176 
The Court’s discourse in Exxon seems likely to create confusion.  While 
the Court identified that its rule was not specifically “the outer limit allowed by 
due process” it later expressed that, regardless, “the constitutional outer limit 
may well be 1:1.”177  Does the Court intend this to become the constitutional 
outer limit?  In January 2009, the Third Circuit had already identified this 
apparent contradiction upon its review of punitive damages that were three 
times greater than compensatory damages in a medical malpractice suit.178  
The Jurinko court indeed applied the 1:1 bright line rule after examining pre-
Exxon cases where this limitation had already been imposed.179  Though 
Exxon’s due process discourse was not dispositive in this opinion, it 
nonetheless had an apparent effect upon the court’s analysis.  Even more 
expressly, the Ninth Circuit identified a “constitutional framework” within 
 
 173. Michael A. Nelson, Constitutional Limits on Punitive Damages: How Much is Too 
Much?, 23 ME. B.J. 42, 44 (2008). 
 174. Id. at 46–47 (identifying circuit and district court cases where courts voluntarily limited 
punitive damages to compensatory damages).  See, e.g., Bach v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 486 F.3d 
150, 153–54 (6th Cir. 2007) (reducing punitive damages for conduct that was not sufficiently 
reprehensible); Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 388 F.3d 29, 62–65 (2d Cir. 2004) (reducing 
punitive damages due to the total award’s size). 
 175. BMW, 517 U.S. at 582 (“[The Court has] consistently rejected the notion that the 
constitutional line is marked by a simple mathematical formula, even one that compares actual 
and potential damages to the punitive award.”). 
 176. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 458 (1993) (citations 
omitted). 
 177. Id. at 2634 n.28. 
 178. Jurinko v. Medical Protective Co., Nos. 06-3519 & 06-3666, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 
26263, at *4041 (3d Cir. Dec. 24, 2008). 
 179. Id. at *48. 
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Exxon which it used to justify one district’s court’s limitation on awarded 
punitive damages.180  Neither court felt bound to the Exxon rule or its due 
process discourse, but both valued Exxon as authority to premise a due process 
limitation upon punitive liability.181 
Similarly, under a purely constitutional review of punitive liability, the 
Eighth Court noted that Exxon “did not mandate this ratio as a matter of 
constitutional law.”182  Still, the court upheld an approximate 1:1 ratio between 
compensatory damages and punitive damages on a claim for conversion by 
crediting Exxon.183  On a separate claim for trespass, however, the court 
declined to enforce the Exxon rule given trespass’s low actual damages but 
high reprehensibility.184  The JCB court’s distinction provides optimism that 
courts, when applying Exxon as a constitutional guidepost for punitive liability, 
will continue to also employ traditional guideposts for limiting punitive 
damages that take into account the nature of the injury and conduct.185 
Given the Supreme Court’s hesitation to articulate a constitutional 
limitation in Exxon—but its relative ease in articulating a limitation upon 
admiralty law—it is imperative that the Court, in the future, protect its thin 
discourse in Exxon that separates the two.  In any event, as lower courts 
haphazardly cite to Exxon to limit punitive liability under due process, the 
inevitable issue presents itself: To what extent will courts unpredictably apply 
Exxon in pursuit of more predictable awards?  Whether the Court intended to 
constitutionally limit punitive liability under due process, it must likely return 
an opinion in the future more express than Exxon  to clarify how the 1:1 ratio 
should be used.  In the meantime, the judicial system can achieve true 
predictability only if courts continue to apply the Court’s due process 
limitations as espoused in Gore and State Farm, and forego Exxon when 
considering damages through the constitutional lens.186 
 
 180. Leavey v. Unum Provident Corp., Nos. 06-16285 & 06-16350, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 
21144, at *8 nn.1–9 (9th Cir. Oct. 6, 2008). 
 181. See id. 
 182. JCB, Inc. v. Union Planters Bank, NA, 539 F.3d 862, 876 n.9 (8th Cir. 2008) (action for 
trespass and conversion) (emphasis added). 
 183. Id. at 876. 
 184. Id. at 876–77. 
 185. Other courts have noted the “importance of keeping these theories straight” between 
constitutional and conventional excessive damages claims.  Kunz v. DeFelice, 538 F.3d 667, 678 
(7th Cir. 2008).  For a discussion on traditional guideposts regarding punitive liability, see State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003). 
 186. For an example of a district court that has expressly identified this distinction, see Smith 
v. Xerox Corp., 584 F.Supp.2d 905, 915 n.18 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (indicating that Exxon was 
inapplicable as a maritime case); Valarie v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., No. 2:07-cv-5, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 93558, at *21–28 (W.D. Mich., Nov. 17, 2008) (offering a lengthy discourse on the 
limited nature of Exxon).  See also Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Miell, 569 F.Supp.2d 841, 859 
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2. Which Maritime Defendants Will Benefit From Exxon’s Rule? 
Admiralty law is unique because it exists as a limited exception to the 
general rule that there is no “federal general common law.”187  In this arena, 
courts have the authority to create what has been termed “the general maritime 
law.”188  The general maritime law is part statutory, part judge-made.  Thus, 
the Court’s decision in Exxon has become mandatory authority for any federal 
court sitting in maritime determining the limit of punitive liability. 
Though few admiralty courts have determined an issue regarding excessive 
punitive damages since Exxon was decided in June 2008, one should presume 
that the 1:1 rule will not have the cleanest application (at least initially).189  
Courts can, of course, theoretically limit punitive damages to compensatory 
damages under circumstances they see fit when no contrary law exists, but 
precisely when they must limit punitive damages in this manner is not entirely 
clear.  Under Exxon, punitive damages must only be limited in precise 
proportion to actual damages when the conduct is not exceptionally 
blameworthy (intentional, malicious, or driven for gain) or when it is without 
“modest economic harm or [low] odds of detection.”190  Arguably, this spans a 
diverse spectrum of conduct that falls within Exxon’s net.  Though Exxon met 
each of these earmarks, it is partially unclear how courts should treat cases that 
meet only the majority of these factors.  At what point should the fact-finder 
determine, for instance, that the odds of detecting reprehensible conduct were 
low enough to warrant higher punitive damages?  At what point does economic 
harm warrant punitive damages in an amount three times the compensatory 
damages?  Knowing only that the rule will apply in cases like Exxon is simply 
not knowing enough, if the true objective of this rule is predictability and 
consistency. 
3. Application of Exxon Rationale Will Not Be Limited to Admiralty 
It goes without saying that courts must apply the “law of the state” in 
issues not governed by the U.S. Constitution or acts of Congress because, as 
 
(N.D. Iowa 2008) (“[T]he [Exxon] Court did not conclude that the Constitution prohibits a 
punitive damage award greater than the amount awarded for compensatory damages . . . .”). 
 187. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
 188. Force, supra note 110, at 1367 (noting “maritime law” is, in fact, the oldest area of 
federal common law).  Though beyond the scope of this note, whether a “general” federal 
maritime law is constitutional remains a hotly debated issue among legal scholars.  See, e.g., Jay 
Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Common Law, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 585, 602–
07 (2006). 
 189. See Norfolk & Portsmouth Belt Line R. Co v. M/V Marlin, No. 2:08cv134, 2009 WL 
1974298, at *4–5 (E.D. Va. April 3, 2009).  In Norfolk, the court rejected plaintiff’s amended 
complaint for punitive damages pursuant to Virginia statute which provided for 3:1 punitive to 
actual damages on the grounds that it conflicted with Exxon.  Id. 
 190. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2633 (2008). 
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Justice Brandeis succinctly stated, “There is no federal general common 
law.”191  This is not to say, however, that when the Supreme Court speaks on 
an issue that it falls on deaf ears.  Inherent in the status of the Supreme Court 
as the highest judiciary body in the United States is the inarguable persuasive 
value its discourse carries; the Court’s status allows it to “set the agenda for the 
country’s political and cultural debate . . . .”192 
Damages and their judicially imposed restraints are not governed by the 
Constitution or Congress . . . yet.  Accordingly, there is no general law that 
governs these restraints.  And the 1:1 bright-line rule in Exxon was carefully 
crafted only for its exclusive application to admiralty law.193  Yet just because 
lower federal and state courts are not required to apply Exxon’s holding does 
not mean they will not find solace within the rule or its rationale when they 
intend to limit punitive damages.  This is a remarkable trend with a familiar 
situation: the Supreme Court looks to state law to guide its decision in a 
narrow area of law, and state courts then take notice of Supreme Court’s 
revised law, under which they are not bound.194 
The Supreme Court’s doctrinal work in maritime law can have dual 
successes when it is well implemented.  When the Court disseminates new law, 
it “not only solves problems in maritime law but may suggest worthy doctrine 
to advance the common law in non-maritime contexts.”195  Just as importantly, 
however, if future application of the Exxon rule does, as Justice Ginsburg has 
suspected, become unworkable, the Court “not only misses an opportunity to 
grow the common law but generally leaves some channel of admiralty law in 
turmoil.”196  As such, nonmaritime courts that implement Exxon or its rationale 
should use caution in maintaining the intent of Exxon to promote predictability. 
Even if courts do not adopt Exxon for its discourse in due process, its 
rationale and objective of increasing predictable awards will nonetheless bear 
strongly upon future courts.  The Ninth Circuit, in its discussion of traditional 
guideposts from State Farm additionally discussed Exxon by explaining that 
“our goal [under Exxon] is to determine whether the punitive damages 
achieved their ultimate objectives of deterrence and punishment, without being 
unreasonable or disproportionate.”197  In a different opinion, the Ninth Circuit 
 
 191. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (1938). 
 192. Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, Setting the Social Agenda: Deciding 
to Review High-Profile Cases at the Supreme Court, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 313, 313, 315 (2009) 
(noting that the “high-profile” cases the Court chooses “frame the broader cultural debate by 
pushing these issues to the forefront of political discourse.”). 
 193. As the Exxon Court stressed, however, state courts and legislatures have heavily 
regulated punitive damage awards.  Exxon, 128 U.S. at 2623. 
 194. See supra Part IV.B. 
 195. Joel K. Goldstein, Towage, 31 J. MAR. L. & COMM. 335, 335 (2000). 
 196. Id. 
 197. S. Union Co. v. Irvin, 563 F.3d 788, 791 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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again relied on the purpose of the Exxon rule as “the importance of notifying 
defendants of their potential punitive damage liability.”198  From these cases it 
is clear that the Court’s well-articulated objective of predictability will 
influence the diligence with which courts will review punitive damages 
awards; even if these awards bear no conformity to one another across the 
board, the judiciary’s cognizance of the importance of predictability will 
undoubtedly support that goal. 
Courts will also apply Exxon to not only achieve the articulated objective 
of predictable punishment but also to ensure that defendants are appropriately 
reprimanded.  This is particularly true given the Court’s consideration of the 
reprehensibility of Exxon’s conduct when limiting punitive damages so 
stringently.  For example, one district court opined that punitive damages in a 
false arrest case were sufficient where the conduct was “outrageous” but 
resulted in “no significant harm.”199  Although this application was converse to 
Exxon (as the harm was less significant than the conduct itself), it illustrates 
the willingness of lower courts to justify awards based on Exxon’s rationale of 
reprehensibility.  Still, other courts will apply Exxon to demonstrate that their 
awards comport with reasonability by employing the Exxon bright-line as a 
guidepost.  Assessments premised upon this rationale will proceed from the 
theory that if a 1:1 ratio between punitive damages and compensatory damages 
was heralded as the maximum in one area, the courts are justified if they 
designate even lower ratios.200 
Before the Court handed down its final decision in Exxon, some predicted 
the decision was “not likely to affect punitive damages in non-maritime 
cases.”201  But in the immediate months after Exxon, one court had already 
remarked that “it is clear that the Supreme Court intends that its holding have a 
much broader application.”202  While only the grace of time and patience of the 
judicial system will indicate exactly how Exxon will be applied outside of 
admiralty, its application is imminent. 
CONCLUSION 
For Exxon, one of the world’s oil giants, Exxon was the grand finale of 
twenty years of litigation; for the plaintiff fishermen and Native Alaskans, it 
 
 198. Research Corp. v. Westport Ins. Corp., 289 Fed.Appx. 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 199. Ellis v. La Vecchia, 567 F.Supp.2d 601, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citations omitted). 
 200. See, e.g., Glass v. Snellbaker, CA No. 05-1971, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71241, at *39 
(D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2008) (noting that the punitive damages awarded only half of what plaintiff 
would receive in back pay in adverse employment case). 
 201. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Take Up Battle over Exxon Valdez Damages, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 28, 2008, at A19. 
 202. Hayduk v. City of Johnstown, 580 F.Supp.2d 429, 483 n.46 (W.D. Pa. 2008). 
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was a “knife in the gut” and a “giant cold slap in the face.”203 Without a doubt, 
a decision that removes $2 billion from damages and imposes a bright-line rule 
on remedies is a decision whose impact is not only substantial to the parties 
involved, but also to each future, similarly-situated litigant.  It is the Exxon 
doctrine, and despite its faults, it is here to stay. 
The discourse between the general common law and admiralty law will 
only continue to grow as federal courts continue to borrow, interpret, and 
articulate principles of state law to fill its voids.  State courts will readopt these 
laws as “new takes” on their old laws regardless of  the context in which these 
laws were changed; the rationale for one rule in one context is often, as it will 
be in Exxon, strong rationale for many rules in many contexts. 
Exxon and its progeny will reinforce the discourse between general 
common law and admiralty law as state laws take note of Exxon’s broad scope 
and introduce it into their common law.  Exxon is a rare composite of law old 
and new, borrowed and blue.  Exxon’s original context in maritime and its 
adoption of state law will be distilled as courts work through its application in 
both the due process analysis and general limitation of punitive damages.  The 
oil has been cleaned, yet the legacy of Exxon is one mess that will continue to 
impact the law for centuries to come. 
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